The implementation of concepts of multiple land use seems to be relevant in the context of large-scale urban projects, which are now predominately monofunctional. However, current governance settings at these projects seem to be unreceptive to this new planning concept. Our in-depth case study of the South Axis project in Amsterdam embraces an actor-centred institutional perspective and seeks to understand how more receptive conditions for norm alignment between key actors can be attained. We reconstruct the introduction of quite radical concepts of multiple land use in this project, which started as an office-development proposal. The implementation was severely hampered by the fact that ambitions were formed in a rather introvert local government -business setting. Only in the last stage, with the adoption of a more extrovert mode of governance that included a variety of national government departments, were more receptive conditions for multiple land use created.
Introduction
The planning concept of multiple land use evokes an attractive spatial image of bustling, urban places with a mixture of uses and activities. The imagery spurs politicians, investors and planners to start thinking about a trajectory away from the current dominance of monofunctionality in land use, which has formed the foundation of modern town planning interventions. Instead, they are induced to move towards a situation wherein investments in different uses are combined or spatially integrated in specific places. These mixed spatial configurations are expected to have different social, financial and ecological advantages. Although many uncertainties remain, the concept has rapidly gained support in professional and academic circles in the last few years.
However, the implementation of the concept in reality, via the complex governance processes wherein decisions on spatial investments are made, is still challenging. Current institutional settingsboth rules and practices -seem to lead to decisions that result in monofunctional development of space (Teisman, 2001) . Or to phrase it more actively, if we want to improve the implementation of concepts of multiple land use, different barriers have to be conquered (Coupland, 1996) . This leads Salet and de Jong (2000) to see a discrepancy between a certain (collective) wish for multiple land use and a reality dominated by monofunctional land use. The origin of this discrepancy and some ways to create conditions more receptive to multiple land use are examined in this paper.
The specific governance processes that we analyze are related to large-scale urban development projects that try to attract and spatially accommodate flows of international investment. The problematic accommodation of these 'global' investments in a local context is a dominant theme in the public and academic critiques on these projects (Moulaert et al., 2003) . Authors like Graham and Marvin (2001) point to the growing fragmentation of space caused by these major urban interventions. This is manifested both physically and visually. The physical result of most contemporary large urban development projects -often located outside traditional spaces of urbanity but well connected to infrastructure -seems to be a completely spatially detached, functional, privatized, controlled and regulated form of space (Hajer and Reijndorp, 2001; Newman and Thornley, 2005) . Critics have referred to these places as 'junkspace' (Koolhaas, 2001) , or as 'non-places' that challenge our common-sense view of planned public spaces as places for encounter, for individual identification and socialization (Koolhaas, 1994; Auge´, 1995) . At the same time, however, by concentrating large investments at well accessible places near infrastructure, for example high-speed train stations or airports, these projects also seem to offer possibilities for programmatic innovations like multiple land use and thereby help create new places of urbanity (Bertolini and Spit, 1998; Gu¨ller and Gu¨ller 2003) . Most projects actually strive for the creation of a certain mixture of uses. However, since the general opinion is one of disappointing spatial performances and a lack of urban qualities, the implementa-tion is not always successful. This does not simply mean that we automatically identify multiple land use with urban quality. Neither does it imply that we want to (or can) quantify the planning concept into a standard recipe for successful urban space. The actual meaning, potential and use of the concept is deeply cultural and place-dependent. Rather, we see the concept as a provocation to think beyond current practices (and spaces) of monofunctionality. It is an invitation to search for new combinations of uses which can help improve the urban potential of places. The reason to specifically study ambitions for multiple land use related to these projects is that they most directly seem to portray the opportunities and necessity for the concept, on the one hand, as well as the difficulties in implementation, on the other.
Studying the conditions under which the concept of multiple land use can flourish in large-scale urban projects cannot be done by limiting our focus to the complex processes of interaction and decisionmaking in one single project. Neither is it satisfactory to theorize about conditions at an abstract level while losing touch with 'messy' aspects of practice. Taking a position on this macro-to-micro continuum, the notion of actors and their (intentional) action seems to be a natural starting point for the analysis of complex social systems (Coleman, 1990) . In specific practices, actors decide on concrete investment projects and the implementation (or non-implementation) of concepts of multiple land use. Actor-centred institutional theories emphasize complexity and idiosyncrasies of individual cases, on the one hand, but try to avoid complete empiricism, on the other. This amounts to theorizing about actors as intentional units embedded in an institutional setting that provides incentives for certain behaviour (Scharpf, 1997 (Scharpf, , 2000 . From a sociological perspective, action of purposeful actors is often understood as being related to the activated social codes of conduct in certain practices, the so-called norms. These social codes of conduct indicate what is acceptable and nonacceptable behaviour. Since most norms are implicit, and in a constant process of reinterpretation, only by acting do actors find out which behaviour is appropriate in a given situation (March and Olsen, 1984) . In other words, there is no linear relationship between structure and action, between macro and micro. Norms help to understand the repertoire of acceptable courses of action, but still ''... leave considerable scope for the strategic and tactical choices of purposeful actors'' (Scharpf, 1997, p. 42) .
We noted that the implementation of concepts of multiple land use is problematic, from an actor-centred institutional point of view. In that light, we advance the following hypothesis: given the interaction surrounding large-scale urban projects, the current constellation of activated norms is unfavourable to investments that lead to multiple land use. This hypothesis is tested through in-depth longitudinal analysis of these practices in case studies. Hereby we hope to understand how norms develop or stabilize over time and what opportunities arise for 'norm alignment', a situation wherein actors start to share a conviction for multiple land use as an acceptable form of 'behaviour'. In this way we can also foster our idea of the inherent 'social' character of norms. Although they shape the behaviour of an individual actor, they are part of a social system (Coleman, 1990) . They are formed, reinterpreted and reconfirmed in practices of interaction wherein multiple actors participate.
Let us summarize the line of reasoning we have set forth in this first section. (1) The implementation of concepts of multiple land use, especially in large-scale urban projects, is seen as relevant.
(2) Although supported by many, the implementation has not been successful in these projects. We expect this to be caused by unreceptive governance settings. (3) An actor-centred institutional approach, which studies to what extent concepts of multiple land use are within the acceptable courses of action (norms), will help us understand the behaviour of key actors in the governance processes on these projects.
Our theoretical approach will be used to analyze the South Axis (Zuidas) project in Amsterdam in the remainder of this article. Information for this part of the study was gathered from documentary research and in-depth interviews with participants in the period September 2001-June 2004. Various qualitative research methods were used. In the course of 3 years, the monthly strategic meetings of the South Axis Project office were observed. In addition, internal documents were analyzed. Further information was gathered by indepth interviews with about 20 key decision-makers from the local government, provincial government, national government, private-sector and non-governmental groups. Information was also gathered during recent expert meetings that were held under the auspices of Zuidas Reflector, an independent monitoring agency for the South Axis project.
2. The concept of multiple land use in the South Axis project (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) Situated around a section of the southern ring road of Amsterdam and an important public transport hub in the strategic transport corridor between the inner city and Schiphol airport, the area known as the South Axis has shown a constant transformation during the last decade. It forms one of the most important and prestigious development sites of the country, clearly aiming to attract international investments. Construction at the South Axis is in full progress right now. Since the mid-nineties almost half a million square metres of floor space for offices in the highest segments has been developed. There are important ambitions for multiple land use, especially for a large housing programme in the area. But the implementation is heavily dependent on a large investment in infrastructure that is uncertain at the time of writing.
2.1 Initiation of the South Axis project (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) The start of the South Axis project is inextricably connected with private initiatives (Majoor, 2004) . Although the area was mentioned in spatial structure plans of the Amsterdam government since 1981 as an overspill office location (Jolles et al., 2003) , and some scattered building activities took place in the eighties, the momentum for large-scale development changed when the ABN/AMRO bank insisted on this location for its new headquarters at the beginning of the nineties. Until then the municipality had tried to develop an area near the Central Railway station as Amsterdam's prime office location. However, developers and investors where unresponsive to this planning initiative (Ploeger, 2004) .
After the failure of that project, the city made a strategic switch in strategy. Instead of pushing private development at certain places, it embraced a more facilitating style, wherein it tried to add value to places with strong private interest. This also meant adopting new forms of governance which secured greater responsiveness to business needs. An example of this was the South Axis Coalition, created in 1995. It included the most important private and public stakeholders in the project. At the time of its creation, this coalition frameworkalbeit informal -represented an explicit attempt at realizing a new level of connectivity in operational support of the project, including both horizontal (interorganizational) as well as vertical (intergovernmental) levels of relationships with key agents. The South Axis Coalition defined long-term commitment around a general vision of development and of the expected mutual benefits, leaving to ad-hoc, situationally defined agreements their short-term contractual and operational definition. In these early days this vision did not include much more than the individual investment proposals of the participants (new headquarters of ABN/AMRO and ING, expansion of the Vrije Universiteit and RAI conference and exhibition centre, expansion of the World Trade Centre), which would transform the area into a new office park.
The strong commitment of the local business elite to the project was matched by an equally strong positioning of the project in the city government organization. In November 1997, the project was officially granted top priority when it received its status as 'major urban project' (Grootstedelijk project). This meant that most publicsector involvement was transferred from the local district council of ZuiderAmstel to the (central) city government level. A small project office (the Projectbureau Zuidas, located on site in the WTC building) was established as a liaison between public and private actors. The aim is to strengthen the steering capacity of the local government, but in a project-oriented way, which is also receptive to private considerations.
Outside the domain of private initiatives and local government, the project was less successfully positioned in these early days. On a local level, the involvement of social, environmental and cultural groups in the project was limited. Outside the Amsterdam setting, the regional government -a relatively weak tier in the Dutch political systemwas almost absent. At the national government the embeddedness in the initial stage was restricted to two departments. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (Ministerie VROM) selected the South Axis as a 'Key Project' in 1997. This programme supported, by means of a small government grant, high-density and mixed-use development around future High Speed Train stations (Schuiling and Majoor, 2001; Ministerie VROM, 2002) . The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat) focused its attention on the expansion of roads and rail in the corridor where the South Axis was located. At that time, the development was planned in a linear fashion to run along both sides of the infrastructure corridor. Accordingly, these proposals were for a large part unrelated to the development plans of the area.
To summarize, the positioning of the project in domains of the local public sector and some major private actors was instrumental in the early phase of the South Axis project. It resulted in institutional innovations, most notably the South Axis Coalition and the city's project office. A project-oriented, 'business-friendly' style of management was adopted that envisioned the development of the area as a common undertaking of public and private parties. The commitment to the project in general was high on the part of the city and the local business elite. While the municipality happily endorsed the development of a prime office location within its boundaries, the private sector profited from the new loose governance settings to quickly develop initiatives for different office complexes. One could conclude that, in a very limited sense, the perfect conditions for norm alignment between actors were created in this first period. However, the long-term vision of how the area would look was still in its infancy.
In the next stage, the city of Amsterdam took the lead. It took the initiative to produce a masterplan which would spatially and functionally integrate the ad-hoc developments and proposals from the first period into a long-term strategic vision for the area. From that moment on, the project started to suffer from its rather introvert business/local government character, a trait that had made progress so smooth in the initial phase.
2.2
The introduction of concepts of multiple land use at the South Axis (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) While the first masterplan revealed a spatial programme consisting mainly of office buildings with some minor other uses (Gemeente Amsterdam 1998), the subsequent updates of this plan show a tendency toward extreme mixing: 45% offices, 45% housing and 10% facilities. All in all, the development would cover approximately 2.7 million m 2 over a thirty-year construction period. The mixing was supposed to result in mixed-use buildings and thereby ensure a truly urban experience (Gemeente Amsterdam, 1999; . The actor that served as the major source of diffusion for this concept was the City of Amsterdam. Multiple land use appealed to city government for several reasons: it fitted into the overall spatial policy aim of the municipality for a more effective utilization of space and a concentration of urban uses within the city boundaries (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003) . Secondly, in the tight housing market of the capital, it created the potential for a rather substantial addition of apartments (approximately 8000), which is very difficult to accommodate elsewhere within the premises of the city. And thirdly, the planning concept was, theoretically, able to create sustainable enthusiasm and support for the project in wider circles of society, especially among citizens, if the project could be portrayed as more than a business park. Most incentives for this new policy direction came up in the interactions with residents of adjoining neighbourhoods and other citizens groups in consultation sessions after presentation of the first masterplan. This diversity of reasons made the pursuit of more multiple land use in the project a fully acceptable course of action for the city government.
The support of both existing businesses and future private investors for the concept was more pragmatic. To a certain extent, their support was still uncertain at the time of writing. For the private sector in general, the conviction grew that a certain mixture of uses could result in a livelier district. This would be an important asset in the high-end office market that the South Axis developers were targeting; the precise economic consequences remained uncertain, however. Another argument on the table was that it could, in the long run, soften the impact of the inevitable price slumps in the development market by providing alternative investments in housing or retail facilities (1).
Realizing ambitions for multiple land use, and especially the addition of a sizeable housing programme, inevitably meant finding a solution for the presence of the infrastructure corridor (highway, train and light rail) in the centre of the project. The infrastructure produces noise and dust that, according to environmental laws, make it impossible to develop housing. Different options were studied, but soon the preference of the city government went in the direction of the socalled Dock model: a proposal to run the entire bundle of infrastructure (for a distance of about 1.2 km) through a tunnel (2). Not only would this solve the environmental problems, it would physically and visually unite the two strips of land on both sides of the infra-corridor. Financing for this expensive model was expected to come from the approximately 1 million m 2 of additional development space that would be realized on top of the infrastructure. The municipality expected that the revenues from these valuable plots would be sufficient to pay for the additional investment, but the financial conse-quences of the proposal (both costs and revenues) were hardly clear in the beginning. Interestingly enough, a private consortium of ABN/ AMRO, ING and Dutch Railways made an offer to the city in 2000 to buy half of the future parcels on the top of the Dock model for a fixed amount, in exchange for development rights. The city and this consortium eventually signed a letter of intent. For the Amsterdam government, this agreement gave important backing to their argument that multiple land use (and the Dock-model) also made sense in business terms.
However, this huge investment was not something the city and private investors could manage themselves. The infrastructure was owned and operated by the national government, more specifically by the Ministry of Transport, itself in the middle of long-term studies on its needed expansion. Their preferred investment option was to expand the current configuration of infrastructure, including the station, on the existing dike that cuts the area in two pieces. This ministry works from an economic cost-benefit perspective, focusing on the transportation benefits of infrastructure investments. From that perspective, the tunnel option does not add up. Not only is it more expensive, but it creates safety issues and results in a very complicated and long period of traffic disruption. Doubts were voiced on the promise of the city government -business coalition that revenues accruing from development on top of the infrastructure would be sufficient to cover the additional costs. A critical report by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis came to the same conclusion (Centraal Planbureau, 2003) (3). Some worrying international research revealed a consistent series of financial fiascos among these 'prestigious' mega-projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) (4). This conclusion was confirmed by a recent Dutch parliamentary commission that studied (cost overruns in) some recent large-scale Dutch infrastructure projects (Tweede Kamer, 2004) . Due to all these reasons, and the limited commitment to the goals of multiple land use at the South Axis, the Ministry of Transport was able, and perfectly right on its own terms, to uphold their own norms and thereby frustrate the coalition that wanted to start realizing the Dock model.
To conclude, in this period, a distinction could be made between two 'separate worlds'. On the one hand, the city, businesses and the Ministry of Spatial Planning, taking a project-oriented perspective, sought to develop a high-density mixed area, for which the Dock model was a necessary prerequisite. On the other hand, the Ministry of Transport, which had to facilitate this investment, taking a sector-oriented perspective, judged this proposal on totally different terms and deemed it to be unwanted. The conditions for norm alignment towards an integral vision for the area wherein multiple land use was possible were far away at that moment.
2.3 Including other governance domains and a change in norms (2003) (2004) In the previous section, we have shown that the introduction of the concept of multiple land use at the South Axis was problematic. This became especially pressing when, after several internal assessments, it turned out that the city government had indeed overestimated its financial capacity to compensate for the additional investment costs of the tunnel by bringing in the revenues from the land on top of it. This induced the city government to change its strategy (5). No longer could it continue lobbying to become a recipient of state support (or subsidies) for a prestigious project beset with economic uncertainties. Instead, Amsterdam had to persuade the national government and other actors to become stakeholders in its development. In other words, it forced the main initiator of the project to position the initiative for the Dock model in broader domains of governance to unlock the situation. From the second half of 2003 till now, the project initiators have been very successful in this strategy, although the strategic repositioning of the project in broader governance domains was only partly a consequence of an intentional strategy, as we shall see. Interestingly enough, especially the connections with wider domains at the level of the national government have improved.
Two 'new' national government departments, namely Economic Affairs and Finance, that had not previously been connected to the project, have been linked (and partly linked themselves) to the project over the past 2 years. This tie eventually strengthened the political discourse of the South Axis as a project of importance for the national economy -and the belief that the Dock model was an inevitable precondition for a top-quality (office) location. The Ministry of Economic Affairs, in its spatial policy frames, is turning its attention away from the traditional redistributive policies towards the support of 'spaces of opportunity' (i.e. spaces that are already seeing favourable economic growth). A sense of urgency about the competitive position of the Netherlands became widespread at different levels of government during a period of economic decline and sharp drops in foreign investments. A policy of stronger prioritization among economic development projects was recently proposed, favouring the western part of the Netherlands (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2004) . The development of the South Axis, and especially the Dock model as the physical prerequisite for a high quality (office) location, fitted perfectly in this line of reasoning.
The Ministry of Finance started expressing its ambitions for the project as well. In a period of severe public spending cuts, this department wants to encourage the use of public-private partnerships in urban development and other spheres of governance (6). It sees the South Axis, and especially a joint development of the Dock model, as a prime opportunity for a financial partnership between national government, local government and the private sector (7).
The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, a long-time supporter of the project because of its ambitions for multiple land use, embraced a new policy wherein the economic aspects of spatial policies became more prominent. A more 'developmental style' of planning should be used to facilitate economic opportunities (Ministerie VROM, 2004) . Obviously, the South Axis project also suited this policy line, since it had already embraced such a development strategy since its initiation.
So, due to all these changes at the national government, the political momentum for the South Axis project, and especially the Dock model, improved from the end of 2003 on. The support for the project, and especially for the Dock model, became an acceptable course of action for a wider range of actors. As a result the ministry of Transportation became more isolated in its resistance to the Dock model (8).
This expanded context resulted in new dynamics in the governance processes on the South Axis. Instead of arguing about support or subsidies, the national government and the city of Amsterdam, in 2004 , jointly decided to study the possibilities to establish a public limited company to build the infrastructure and develop the building plots on top of the tunnel (see Table 1 ). Quickly, various steps were taken to solve the infrastructure controversy. On the one hand, proposals were made to cut investment costs for the tunnel infrastructure. On the other, new financial means were found at the national government, the regional government and a wider array of private investors (Brinkman, 2004) .
Conclusions
In this article we have studied the conditions under which concepts of multiple land use can flourish in large-scale urban projects. Since we only described one case study we first have to decontextualize our experiences in Amsterdam a little by typifying in very general terms the governance situations wherein these projects are conceived. Two large overviews on governance aspects of large-scale urban projects in Europe (Moulaert et al. 2003; Salet and Gualini, 2006) show that specific project-oriented forms of governance, with close cooperation between public and private actors, are dominant. They are praised by proponents as being effective to align public and private goals, facilitate investments and to combat red tape. The choice for such a project-oriented, private investment-facilitating mode of governance at an operational level results often in a quick consensus between a limited group of actors. That group then plans, develops and manages a project in rather introvert neo-corporatist ways.
Generally speaking, the introduction of ambitions for (more) multiple land use by key actors (mostly governments), which can be Process is started to set up a joint public-private development corporation South Axis justified on the basis of some of the arguments we stated at the beginning of our article, create an additional layer of complexity in these settings. It makes investments dependent on each other and demands innovative spatial and financial constructions. While the modernist planning ideal of monofunctionality of spaces tried to eliminate planning conflicts, ambitions for multiple land use create new ones. The reason is that the concept of multiple use celebrates and tries to reshape the inherent complexity of an urban experience. Our conclusion is that these project-oriented modes of governance seem to be unsuited to manage this increase in complexity. While they may be successful in creating norm alignment between actors in an 'easier', more straightforward spatial configuration (i.e. monofunctionality), they fail to create settings wherein proposals for multiple land use can be adequately handled. What does our case study tell us about the reasons for this? And how can more receptive conditions for multiple land use at large projects be created?
As we already noted, although it may be accepted as a policy discourse in general, it is not a universal part of the acceptable range of choices of the extended collection of actors necessary to form, plan, develop and implement these ambitions. Our actor-centred perspective on the South Axis shows that if governance settings are not connected, the main actors are able to act in an introvert manner and pursue their aim of monofunctionality rather than committing themselves to a fragile collective norm of multiple land use. In this case, the Ministry of Transport did not want to integrate its infrastructure investments with urban development in the form of a Dock model. This seems to be a conclusion that can be generalized to other situations as well. In many cases, investments in monofunctional forms of land use are easier to arrange. From the perspective of a single actor, monofunctional land use avoids complex interchanges and interdependencies with other actors on issues like finance, design, safety, maintenance and regulations, to name just a few. Private investors try to avoid additional investment risks. Therefore, its results may be praised as a noteworthy collective good, also by actors not aligned to a norm of multiple land use, however, if it is not in their private acceptable course of action, it is not pursued. This conclusion comes as no surprise. It is a problem underlying many of the failed practices of implementation of concepts of multiple land use worldwide (Kreukels and van Vliet, 2001) .
Solving some of these very practical problems of multiple land use is obviously one of the directions forward. However, our specific perspective goes a little further. We focus on the possibility for more receptive governance settings for multiple land use.
We found out that to realize more receptive conditions, it is necessary to create settings wherein the actual meaning of places can be discussed. We believe that within such settings, the appeal and the actual collective advantages of the concept can flourish better than they usually do nowadays when the concept is discussed within the limited settings of some (enlightened) supporters. In such a more connected situation, the pros and cons of the concept can be discussed in a much more comprehensive way. This could be the basis for normalignment about the concept among a more extensive group of actors.
At the South Axis we found excellent connectivity between (and within) the local government domain and the local business community. In this setting a strong form of norm alignment was achieved in favour of the implementation of multiple land use. The South Axis project office was capable of overcoming most intra-municipal difficulties by managing the project integrally, not as if it were directly connected to specific local government departments. Meanwhile, the South Axis Coalition formed a loose public-private institutional backbone behind a strategy of excellence for the area. Within this setting, the proposal for an extreme form of multiple land use in the area that came on the table after 1997 was quickly embraced in all parts of the Amsterdam government and by three major private investors in the area, ABN/AMRO, ING and Dutch Railways. They adopted it not because all the implementation problems had suddenly disappeared but because the concept of multiple land use was part of a strong discourse of maximizing the potential of the area. A shared conviction was created that a densely built mixed area created the best physical conditions for this. This general vision was stronger -in a rather superficial way, of course, because the discussion was about planning concepts, not so much about building projects -than all kinds of practical problems, from an actor perspective, associated with the increased complexity of the development of the area.
However, in the stage of turning the planning concept into reality, this coalition found out that the setting wherein this ambition was formed, was still too introvert. The implementation depended on support from higher tiers of government. Only after 2003, when the connectivity with this governance domain was enhanced (especially to link up with national ministries other than Spatial Planning and Transport), did the chances for the Dock model -and multiple land use -really improve. The result of this phase was that a wider group of actors identified with the goals of the project and aligned to a norm of multiple land use.
Improving conditions for multiple land use does not mean trying to overrule key actors that are not aligned to the norm. Rather, it means trying to understand and accept their position and make it workable. In the case of the South Axis, from the perspective of the Ministry of Transport, the disadvantages of multiple land use (the Dock model) continued to outweigh its rewards, also in the new period. Nevertheless, by placing their objections in a wider setting where more comprehensive visions for the area were debated and a strong norm alignment for multiple land use existed, the importance of these technical objections was 'downgraded' in favour of a common goal. The result was that, due to this strong emerging norm in the last period, pragmatic solutions to solve the infrastructure issues were being sought. This does not undermine the value of the specific arguments of the ministry of Transport in this case. It shows that within a different, more connected setting, other kinds of discussions and solutions are sought and found.
Our conclusion is therefore that, to enhance the chances for multiple land use, more 'extrovert' settings of governance action are needed that connect the goals of a wider variety of actors. The current governance settings, especially around large-scale projects, are often not capable of organizing this connectivity. It is important to note, however, that multiple land use is not a goal in itself. Nor does more connectivity in the governance processes for these projects guarantee their implementation. Nevertheless, it creates the opportunity to discuss, in a more comprehensive and inclusive way, the spatial framework of an urban site. This leads to a situation wherein the concept of multiple land use can be judged on its merits and a critical mass of key actors can start aligning to a collective norm.
For the South Axis project, the time is coming, after the improved connection with the national government, to connect the project even further. It now has to open up to wider circles in society. A truly urban place cannot be created at the negotiating table. Nor can this be done by merely presenting an appealing planning concept. The much wanted urban variety at these places, wherefore the planning concept of multiple land use is ultimately only a physical prerequisite, cannot be accomplished if the project fails to create broad identification, (political) involvement and extensive use by wider societal groups. This is perhaps a much higher mountain to climb, a goal still out of reach for the South Axis and many comparable projects. The spatial concept of multiple land use can at least help by providing an attractive discourse to guide this process.
Notes 1 While a 45/45/10 ratio of offices, housing and facilities seems to be accepted by the business community, it is unsure if this consensus will hold up during the actual interpretation of these guidelines in concrete mixed projects. A 'hot topic' in this regard is the integration of social (or low-cost) housing in the project. This is a wish expressed by the local government, one which seems to be difficult to reconcile with the ambitions expressed by the business community for a district of excellence. 2 Other alternatives studied were (in an early phase) the 'Deck model', which would create plots of land on top of the infrastructure, without lowering it; and (later) the 'Combination model', which would only construct the motorway in a tunnel (see also the introduction to this special issue). These alternatives were not appealing, for a variety of reasons, to either the local or the national government. 3 The report (Centraal Planbureau, 2003) estimates an investment of 1.6 billion euro for infrastructure and an additional 850 million euro for preparation of the sites for construction. Total revenues from the sale of land amount to 1.1 billion euro; revenues from an increase in the value of offices on top of the tunnel and in the immediate vicinity amount to 450 million euro; and revenues from benefits for local and regional traffic together amount to 100 million euro (all at 2003 prices). This creates a deficit of 800 million euro. The same method results in a deficit of 500 million euro if the infrastructure were to be built on the existing dike level. It is interesting to note that recent numbers that were presented by an independent negotiator shows a much smaller deficit (Brinkman, 2004) . 4 Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) show that costs of large infrastructure projects like tunnels and bridges for road and rail are almost consistently underestimated, especially due to poor risk assessments and sometimes to deliberate lies by project proponents. To make matters worse, possible benefits of these projects are almost always overestimated. Most of these findings were confirmed in a recent study by a parliamentarian commission on large-scale infrastructure projects in the Netherlands (Tweede Kamer, 2004) . 5 This change in position was also influenced by another major infrastructure project in Amsterdam: the North/South subway line. The national government, anxious about cost overruns, allocated a fixed budget for the line that will be completed in 2012. All cost overruns during construction are therefore to be borne by the local government. With this risk dominating the possibilities for government spending in the next decade, the risk of developing the South Axis had to be reduced (Interview 2004). 6 For this reason it has set up the PPP Knowledge Centre [Kenniscentrum PPS], http://pps.minfin.nl. 7 Interview Ministry of Finance (2004) . 8 A top official at the Ministry of Transportation acknowledged that the ministry is still opposed to the Dock model. But as part of the national government, it now fol-lows an approach wherein it is receptively looking for ways to make the Dock model possible (Interview 2004) .
